Legal update October 2024 – October 2025 by Craig Carr of 7 Bedford Row Chambers, London

This update discusses the proposed important changes to the law of Limitation in the Crime and Policing Bill as at the date of the AGM below at which this talk was given

ACAL AGM 15 October 2025

Crime and Policing Bill 2025

1. Proposes a new s.11ZA, 11ZB, and 12(1A) of the Limitation Act 1980:

11ZA Actions in respect of personal injuries attributable to child sexual abuse

(1) None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act apply to an action to which this section applies.

(2) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision) which meets conditions 1 to 3.

(3) Condition 1 is that the damages claimed by the claimant consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the claimant.

(4) Condition 2 is that the claimant was under 18 on the date on which the cause of action accrued.

(5) Condition 3 is that the act or omission to which the claimant’s personal injuries were attributable constituted sexual abuse.

(6) This section applies in relation to actions brought, and causes of action accrued, before (as well as after) this section comes into force.

(7) But it does not apply in relation to a claim which, before this section comes into force, was settled by agreement between the parties or determined by a court (whether or not the determination is subject to appeal).

(8) This section does not apply to any action brought for damages under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

(9) This section does not apply to a cause of action surviving for the benefit of a person’s estate by virtue of section 1 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, except where an action was brought by the person before the person’s death.

11ZB Dismissal of actions in respect of personal injuries attributable to child sexual abuse

• This section applies where an action to which section 11ZA applies is brought after the expiration of the time limit that would apply but for that section (disregarding the possibility of the time limit being disapplied under section 33).

• The court must dismiss the action if the defendant satisfies the court that it is not possible for a fair hearing to take place.

• The court must also dismiss the action if—

(a) the action was begun, or the cause of action accrued, before section 11ZA came into force,

(b) the defendant satisfies the court that, because of the application of section 11ZA, there would be substantial prejudice to the defendant if the action were to proceed, and

(c) having regard to that prejudice, and the prejudice to the claimant if the action is dismissed, the court is satisfied that it would not be equitable to allow the action to proceed.

• In this section “the court” means the court in which the action has been brought.”

s.12(1A)

(1A) An action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 may not be brought if—

(a) section 11ZA would have applied to an action by the person injured to recover damages in respect of the injury, and

(b) the death occurred after the expiration of the time limit that would have applied but for that section (disregarding the possibility of that time limit being overridden under section 33).

2. Press release, 05.02.25:

The three-year time limit for victims to bring personal injury claims will be removed. So will the burden of proof that currently rests on victims’ shoulders, who must prove it is possible to hold a fair trial for one to go ahead. Now, that burden is lifted off victims and placed on defendants, who must show a fair trial cannot proceed if they intend to block one. This will enable cases to be heard more easily, and protect victims from reliving their trauma.

As a direct result of today’s reforms, all cases brought will proceed unless the defendant proves that a fair hearing cannot take place, for example due to lack of evidence.

3. MOJ Consultation response, 05.02.25:

While courts currently have the discretion to allow claims to proceed it seems clear that removal of the limitation period would send a clear message of the Government`s intent that victims and survivors of child sexual abuse should not have to suffer the further injustice that responses to this consultation show a limitation period may impose.

The Government recognises concerns about ensuring the right of defendants to a fair trial is protected and as recommended by the IICSA, would seek to ensure that any legislative changes in this area expressly recognise the importance of a fair trial.

In addition, the Government also agree with the IICSA`s recommendation that this reform should not apply where a case has already been determined or settled in court.

4. What change? cf Greater Manchester v Carroll:

Furthermore, while the ultimate burden is on a claimant to show that it would be inequitable to disapply the statute, the evidential burden of showing that the evidence adduced, or likely to be adduced, by the defendant is, or is likely to be, less cogent because of the delay is on the defendant. If relevant or potentially relevant documentation has been destroyed or lost by the defendant irresponsibly, that is a factor which may weigh against the defendant:

The prospects of a fair trial are important. The Limitation Acts are designed to protect defendants from the injustice of having to fight stale claims, especially when any witnesses the defendant might have been able to rely on are not available or have no recollection and there are no documents to assist the court in deciding what was done or not done and why. It is, therefore, particularly relevant whether, and to what extent, the defendant’s ability to defend the claim has been prejudiced by the lapse of time because of the absence of relevant witnesses and documents.

5. Note also, in Chapter 2, the introduction of a mandatory reporting duty. Those involved in working with children will be required to report their suspicion of child sexual abuse to the police or local authority in circumstances where:

6. They witness a child sex offence.
7. They see an image or hear a recording of a child sex offence.
8. A child discloses something that would cause a reasonable person (in the same field of activity as them) to suspect a child sex offence may have been committed.
9. A suspected abuser discloses something that would cause a reasonable person (in the same field of activity as them) to suspect a child sex offence may have been committed.
10. Failing to report will not be an offence but will be considered relevant for consideration of inclusion on the Disclosure and Barring Service children’s barred list.
11. It will be an offence (s.79) to engage in any conduct with the intention of preventing or deterring someone from complying with the duty.

November 2024, LBX

8. LBX v (1) Aldridge (2) The Bedgebury Foundation Trustee Company [2024] EWHC 3587, Master Dagnall.

9. D2’s application, post settlement of C’s claim, for summary judgment on a contribution claim v D2. Key points:

1. A bona fide settlement between D2 and C did not determine D1’s liability to C.

1. Settling an out of time claim did not necessarily mean the settlement was not bona fide.

1. On the facts, the settlement was bona fide and entered into in good faith.

1. D1’s conviction in respect of the abuse did not mean his defence had no real prospect of success.

1. C’s default judgment against D1 did however justify summary judgment on the contribution claim.

December 2024, Samrai

10. Samrai & ors v Kalia [2024] EWHC 3143, Spencer J.

11. Trial on liability, limitation, and quantum in an abuse claim including allegations of ‘spiritual abuse’. Key points:

1. Seven claimants pursuing claims against a priest.

1. C1 – C7 pursued claims of undue influence in respect of unpaid work and financial payments.

1. C1 alleged sexual abuse in adulthood contending a compromised ability to consent due to D’s undue influence.

1. C2, C3 and C4 alleged sexual abuse in childhood and adulthood.

1. C5 and C6 had their claims struck out mid trial due to non-compliant witness statements.

1. The evidence on both sides was tainted with lack of candour, lies and attempts to conceal the truth.

1. C’s expert came in for heavy criticism, it being found:

1. There was an attempt to deceive the court.

1. She was not impartial.

• She had omitted detail from her report.

1. She had plagiarised an academic article without credit.

1. Her report contained inaccuracy and supposition.

1. It was found C1 had a consensual sexual relationship with D. She was an adult and

had some experience of the world and of men, and would have understood that she had a choice whether or not to consent to sexual intercourse. I find that, when Ms Samrai met the Defendant at hotels, as she described, she went voluntarily and knowing that the purpose was for them to have sexual intercourse: she was not an automaton and retained her free will and ability to choose.

The judge noted Prof Maden’s comments on coercion of adults into sexual activity: it is not something that arises from someone simply being asked or told to do something while living and working at liberty.

1. Judge did not find C2-C4’s allegations of sexual abuse proven.

1. Limitation not extended in C1-C4’s claims for reasons mainly relating to the (lack of) credibility of their evidence and their conduct (failing to disclose records, suppressing/deleting evidence, not being frank, persuading witnesses to lie for them, exaggerating the schedule of loss).

1. The undue influence claims lacked specificity and in any event the involvement with, and payments to, the Temple were wholly voluntary and associated with their faith: the fact that she has lost that faith, for whatever reason, does not convert her previous devotion and service into something that is actionable and giving rise to damages.

January 2025, Woodcock

12. CC of Northamptonshire Police v Woodcock, HD & Ors v CC of Wiltshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 13 Holroyde LJ, Stuart-Smith LJ, Jeremy Baker LJ.

13. Conjoined appeals considering liability of a public authority to prevent harm by a third party. Key points:

1. In Woodcock, where the police had devised a safety plan that involved C asking her neighbours to keep a look out for her ex-partner who, shortly before attacking her, was reported to the police by a neighbour

1. There was no assumption of responsibility. The police had not promised to pass on information or respond within any particular timeframe.

1. They had not told the neighbour they would pass on the information or prevent an attack.

• There is no evidence the police, in taking the call, prevented the neighbour taking preventative action. The neighbour had said “I don’t really want to get involved”.

1. The police had no control over the ex-partner.

1. The case was one of omission that did not make matters worse.

1. In HD, where five children pursued common law and ECHR claims against the police after they seized a laptop containing indecent images, but then delayed the examination of the laptop and the arrest of the individual who had downloaded the images, who abused the five children in the period of delay:

1. It was clear that there were significant failings in the investigation of the indecent images.

1. Two of the claimants argued that there was a common law duty on the basis that there were positive acts that made things worse (the assumption of responsibility argument was not pursued).

• The positive acts were said to include the officer in question retaining the case, which prevented an appropriate investigation by better qualified officers, and then closing the case and not properly pursuing it.

1. It was also argued, insofar as there was an omission, the officer had prevented others from protecting the claimants.

1. These arguments were rejected. The court found that the failings of the officer were omissions noting if [the officer] had not taken any action at all, none of the appellants would have been in any better position.

1. There was no evidential basis for the contention that others (e.g. the family) were prevented from taking steps to identify the downloader of the images.

• The ECHR claims of all claimants failed on the basis that Art 3 was not engaged; the investigation into the indecent images (neither numerous nor of the most serious kind) was not an article 3 investigation and even if it had been, it would have been an article 3 investigation in respect of the children depicted, not the claimants.

Craig Carr

7BR

October 2025